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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-3704 
_____________ 
 
* KIM POTOCZNY, as Executrix of the Estate  
of Emil William Potoczny, Jr., 
             Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 AURORA LOAN SERVICES;  
 AURORA BANK FSB; 
 PHELAN HALLINAN & SCHMIEG 
 
 *Pursuant to 43 (c) 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-1769 
_____________ 
 
KIM POTOCZNY, as Executrix of the Estate  
 of Emil William Potoczny, Jr., 
                                      Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE;  
 PHELAN HALLINAN & SCHMIEG  
 _____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Nos. 2:12-cv-01251, 2:13-cv-03848) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 11, 2015 
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Before:  FUENTES, CHAGARES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: December 21, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff Kim Potoczny1 appeals the District Court’s denial of her motion for 
summary judgment, and the District Court’s grant of defendant Aurora Loan Services’s 
(“ALS”) and Aurora Bank FSB’s (collectively, “Aurora”), Nationstar Mortgage’s 
(“Nationstar”), and Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg’s (“PHS”) cross-motions for summary 
judgment.  The consolidated cases before us present two primary issues:  (1) whether 
Aurora and Nationstar, as holders of an indorsed-in-blank promissory note, violated 
certain debt collection statutes by seeking foreclosure on the mortgage securing that note; 
and (2) whether Aurora and Nationstar improperly charged escrow payments from 
Potoczny.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s orders.  
I. 
 We write solely for the parties and therefore recite only the facts necessary to our 
disposition.  In 2006, Emil W. Potoczny, Jr. executed a $100,000 promissory note to 
Home Loan Center d/b/a LendingTree (“LendingTree”), which was secured by a 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 Appellant Kim Potoczny is acting as executrix of the estate of Emil W. Potoczny, Jr., 
and was substituted in his place in the District Court actions and the instant appeals.  We 
will refer to Kim Potoczny and Emil W. Potoczny, Jr. as “Potoczny” interchangeably.  
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residential mortgage.  Under the terms of the mortgage agreement, LendingTree was the 
originating mortgage lender, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
(“MERS”) was to act as their nominee.  LendingTree also agreed to waive collection of 
escrow for property taxes and insurance premiums.  However, the mortgage agreement 
provided that, at any time, the lender could unilaterally revoke the escrow waiver by 
providing written notice to Potoczny.  With escrow payments waived, Potoczny’s 
monthly payments were approximately $717.00, which included his contractual principal 
and interest payments.   
Shortly thereafter, a series of changes were made regarding the servicing of the 
loan, possession of the note, and assignment of the mortgage.  First, in 2006, 
LendingTree transferred servicing of the loan to ALS, who then transferred servicing to 
Nationstar in 2012.  Second, there were multiple changes in the possession of the note 
between 2006 and 2010.  After the note was indorsed to Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, 
and then Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., it was indorsed in blank.  By December 2010, 
Aurora had possession of the indorsed-in-blank note.  Nationstar had possession by July 
2012.  Third, a series of transactions purported to assign the mortgage.  In 2011, MERS, 
acting as the lender’s nominee, assigned the mortgage to ALS.  And in 2012, ALS 
assigned the mortgage to Nationstar.  Potoczny disputes the validity of these assignments.  
Significantly, in October 2009, Potoczny agreed to and executed a temporary 
Home Affordable Modification Trial Period Plan (the “Trial Plan”), which would have 
modified his mortgage if Aurora (who was identified in the Trial Plan as the “Lender or 
Servicer”) were to execute the Trial Plan during the trial period.  The Trial Plan explicitly 
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provided that it “constitutes notice that the Lender’s waiver as to payment of Escrow 
Items, if any, has been revoked and [Potoczny] ha[s] been advised of the amount needed 
to fund [his] escrow account, and [Potoczny] agree[s] to the establishment of an escrow 
account.”  App. 168.  Potoczny began making escrow payments, increasing his monthly 
payments to approximately $837 — the amount identified and required under the Trial 
Plan.  Aurora, however, did not return a fully executed copy during the trial period, and 
the Trial Plan expired in 2010.  After the expiration of the Trial Plan, Potoczny again 
began making monthly payments of approximately $717.2   
By early 2011, Potoczny was in default.  On November 23, 2011, Aurora 
commenced foreclosure proceedings in Pennsylvania state court.  Potoczny then filed the 
instant federal court actions.  In the first action (the “Aurora Action”), Potoczny alleges 
that Aurora and PHS, as Aurora’s counsel, violated the federal Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (the “FDCPA”), Pennsylvania Fair Credit 
Extension Uniformity Act, 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 2270.1–2270.6 (the “FCEUA”), 
Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§§ 201-1 to 201-9.3 (the “UTPCPL”), and committed breach of contract under 
Pennsylvania common law.  In the second action (the “Nationstar Action”), Potoczny 
makes analogous allegations under the FDCPA, the FCEUA, and the UTPCPL against 
Aurora’s successor, Nationstar.  
                                              
2 A November 2009 escrow account statement, however, listed the monthly payment due, 
including escrow, as approximately $1,416.19.  There is no indication that Potoczny ever 
paid that amount, but at least one statement (after Potoczny had defaulted) sought 
$1,416.19.  See Potoczny v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 33 F. Supp. 3d 554, 567 n.21 
(E.D. Pa. 2014).  
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 The District Court denied Potoczny’s motion for summary judgment, and granted 
the defendants’ cross-motions for summary judgment.  Potoczny timely appealed.   
II. 
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a), 
and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review a final decision of a 
district court.  We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  See 
McMaster v. E. Armored Servs., 780 F.3d 167, 169 n.2 (3d Cir. 2015).  Summary 
judgment is appropriate “if, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 
party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Young v. Martin, 801 F.3d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(quotation marks and alteration marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
III. 
A. 
 Under the FDCPA, “[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or 
misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1692e.  Potoczny argues that the defendants violated this section of the FDCPA 
when they sought to foreclose on a debt they “did not own.”  Potoczny Br. 3.  We hold, 
as did the District Court, that by virtue of their possession of the indorsed-in-blank 
promissory note, Aurora and Nationstar were entitled to enforce the note and initiate 
foreclosure proceedings.  Therefore, the District Court properly granted summary 
judgment. 
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 Under Pennsylvania’s Uniform Commercial Code (“PUCC”), a “[p]erson entitled 
to enforce” an instrument includes the holder of the instrument, a nonholder in possession 
of the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or even a person who is “not the owner 
of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument.”  13 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
3301.  Pennsylvania courts have routinely held that a note securing a mortgage is a 
negotiable instrument under PUCC, and when indorsed in blank, is enforceable by its 
possessor.  See J.P. Morgan Chase Bank v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258, 1266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2013) (“[W]e conclude that the Note secured by the Mortgage in the instant case is a 
negotiable instrument under the PUCC.  As such we find [the defendant’s] challenges to 
the chain of possession by which [plaintiff] came to hold the Note immaterial to its 
enforceability.”).  See also In re Walker, 466 B.R. 271, 281-86 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2012) 
(holding that, where trustee had possession of an indorsed-in-blank note, trustee had right 
to enforce note).   
 Similarly here, prior to initiating foreclosure proceedings, Aurora and Nationstar 
had possession of the indorsed-in-blank promissory note, and thus they were entitled to 
enforce the note.  And as they were entitled to enforce the note, Aurora and Nationstar 
were entitled to seek foreclosure.  See, e.g., United States Bank, N.A. v. Pautenis, 118 
A.3d 386, 393 n.8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (“Pursuant to our holding in [Murray], if the 
purported mortgagee establishes that it holds the original note, indorsed to it or in blank, 
it is entitled to enforce the note even in the face of questions regarding the chain of 
possession.  If the purported mortgagee is unable to establish that it is the holder of the 
note or that the note is indorsed to it or in blank, the purported mortgagee may be 
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required to provide proof of the chain of possession to be entitled to proceed in the 
foreclosure action.”).  
 It is immaterial whether there were defects in the assignment of the mortgage from 
MERS to Aurora.  First, Aurora was the holder of the indorsed-in-blank note, and thus 
was entitled to enforce it in foreclosure proceedings even if there were defects in the 
chain of assignment.  See, e.g., Murray, 63 A.3d at 1267 (“Should Appellee successfully 
establish that it holds the original Note, and that it is indorsed in blank, under the UCC it 
will be entitled to enforce the Note . . . even if there remain questions as to the chain of 
possession of the Note.”).  Second, as the District Court noted, “[b]ecause any payments 
made to the holder of the note will discharge a debtor’s liability under the note, 
[Potoczny] cannot be harmed by paying the holder, even if the holder failed to comply 
with certain transfer requirements.”  Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 566 
n.18.  See also In re Walker, 466 B.R. at 285 (“If a borrower cannot demonstrate 
potential injury from the enforcement of the note and mortgage by a party acting under a 
defective assignment, the borrower lacks standing to raise the issue.”). 
 Finally, it is worth noting that the language in the servicing agreement supports 
affirmance.  Potoczny maintains that Aurora and Nationstar were merely servicers of the 
loan, and could, at most, act as an agent or designated custodian of the securitization 
trustee.  Yet, the servicing agreement explicitly provides that:  
each Servicer shall have full power and authority . . . to do any and all 
things that it may deem necessary or desirable in connection with the 
servicing and administration of the Mortgage Loans, included but not 
limited to the power and authority . . . to effectuate foreclosure or other 
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conversion of the ownership of the Mortgaged Property securing any 
Mortgage Loan.  
 
App. 115.  See also Potoczny v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, 2015 WL 787699, at *2 
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2015).  Thus, even the terms of the servicing agreement provide that 
the loan servicers could effectuate foreclosure.  
B. 
Under the FDCPA, a debt collector is prohibited from using “unfair or 
unconscionable means” to collect or attempt to collect any debt, including “[t]he 
collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the 
principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement 
creating the debt or permitted by law.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).  Potoczny alleges that 
Aurora and PHS violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) by attempting to collect escrow fees 
because:  (1) the escrow waiver had not been revoked, and (2) even if the waiver had 
been revoked, the $1,416.19 payment sought was greater than the $837.27 payment 
identified in the Trial Plan.   
We hold, as did the District Court, that the escrow waiver had been revoked by 
late 2009.  Potoczny received notice — by the signed Trial Plan and the 2009 escrow 
account statement — that Aurora intended to collect escrow payments.  Further, Potoczny 
has not provided evidence that the $1,416 escrow payment was unauthorized or 
excessive, except for noting that it was a higher amount than that charged pursuant to the 
Trial Plan.  However, the 2009 escrow amount statement indicated that with escrow 
payments, Potoczny’s monthly payment would be $1,416.19.  See Aurora Loan Servs., 
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LLC, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 567 n.21.  Thus, we agree with the District Court that the grant of 
summary judgment was appropriate regarding Potoczny’s claims alleging unauthorized 
and excessive escrow charges.3   
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders denying 
Potoczny’s motion for summary judgment, and granting defendants Aurora’s, 
Nationstar’s, and PHS’s cross-motions for summary judgment.   
                                              
3 Our reasoning also applies to Potoczny’s Pennsylvania state law claims, which are 
analogous to or derivative of the FDCPA claims here, see Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 33 
F. Supp. 3d at 568, and, accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of 
those claims as well.  
